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This paper examines how agency problems combined with overconÞdence and
hubris by coop management lead to ﬁnancial failure in the Saskatchewan Wheat
Pool. As a consequence of both of these problems, the Pool made poor investment
decisions and ended up in severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties. These problems were exac-
erbated by three additional factors: (1) ownership and control were separated via
an A-B share structure, leading to a situation where neither farmer members nor
investors had an incentive to monitor management activities; (2) the sheer volume
of investment activity undertaken made it virtually impossible for the board to stay
on top of what was happening; and (3) as a result of the change ﬁnancial structure,
senior management had available a large amount of debt capital that it could spend.
Introduction
On 30 August 2007, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP or Pool) ofﬁcially be-
came known as Viterra, thereby formally severing all links to its cooperative roots.
The real loss of its cooperative structure, however, occurred earlier. A number of
dates vie for the honor: April 1996, when Pool shares began trading on the Toronto
Stock Exchange, making the cooperative at that time one of but a handful in the
world with publicly traded shares; January 2003, when, as part of a massive C$405
million debt restructuring plan, the number of farmer-member directors was re-
ducedfromtwelvetoeightandfourindependentdirectorswereadded,oneofwhom
was designated as the lead director with responsibility for managing the board; or
February 2005, when the SWPÕs board of directors approved a recapitalization
plan that transformed the Pool from a cooperative to a business corporation.
During the period marked by the dates above, the Pool went through a number
of major transformations. In the early 1990s, the Pool was the dominant player in
the grain handling business in Western Canada, with a market share in its home
province of nearly 60 percent and a major voice in Canadian agricultural policy.
Through the 1990s, the Pool diversiﬁed, investing heavily offshore and in the do-
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mestic grain processing and hog industries, all the while undertaking a massive re-
structuring of its grain elevator system. By the late 1990s, the Pool had lost a large
percentage of its market share, major ﬁnancial losses were being incurred, and debt
was rapidly mounting. In 2000, a new CEO was hired and the company began sell-
ing off assets in an effort to stay solvent. After narrowly escaping bankruptcy in Jan-
uary 2003, the company began to turn its ﬁnancial position around. In late 2006, the
Pool announced a takeover bid for Agricore United. The bid was successful and the
Pool once again became the dominant player in the Canadian grain-handling indus-
try. In 2009 Viterra moved to become more multinational in scope with a takeover
bid for Australia’s ABB Grain Ltd.
The purpose of this article is to examine the factors behind the events at SWP
in the 1990s. During this period, the Pool’s dramatic loss of market share and ac-
cumulation of debt placed it on a trajectory that resulted in it eventually losing its
cooperative structure. Although the events after this period are fascinating and wor-
thy of study, they are not examined because they are the result of a different set of
dynamics driven by the Pool’s attempts to deal with problems created during the
1990s. While many forces contributed to the decisions made during the 1990s, this
article concentrates on two key factors: the hubris and over-conﬁdence of senior
management and a lack of effective oversight by the board of directors.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief
history of the Canadian grain handling system and the Pool’s role within it. The sec-
tion following that provides details on the Pool’s market and ﬁnancial performance
during the mid-1980s to early 2000s timeframe. The article then presents the two
conceptual frameworks used in the case study—cognitive theory and agency the-
ory. These frameworks are followed by the presentation of evidence from personal
interviews conducted with Pool senior management and elected ofﬁcials to support
the hypothesis that hubris among senior management and a lack of oversight by
the board led to poor investment decisions at the Pool. The article concludes with a
brief summary and discussion.
Overview of SWP and the Canadian Grain Handling System
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool was one of three “wheat pool” co-ops that formed
in the 1920s in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta to collectively market wheat
on behalf of their farmer-members through a jointly owned Central Selling Agency
(CSA).1 Through pooling accounts, each farmer received the same price regardless
of the time of year they sold their grain.
The Pools were successful for several years until a poor quality wheat crop in
1928 and falling grain prices beginning in 1929 (which resulted in an overpayment
to farmers and mounting margin calls) led the federal government to step in and dis-Vol. 23[2009] 3
solve the CSA (Fowke 1957, p. 248–251). After the dissolution of the CSA, farmers
pressured the government to continue grain pooling through a state enterprise, the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB).
With the CWB marketing wheat, the Pools (along with the United Grain Grow-
ers (UGG)) operated as farmer-owned grain handling companies. (For further in-
formation on the Alberta and Manitoba Pools, and UGG, see Earl 2009.) Although
SWP’s core business activity was grain handling, it was diversiﬁed in other agri-
business areas. By the 1990s, the Pool’s ﬁve operating divisions were: grain han-
dling and marketing; agri-products; agri-food processing; livestock production and
marketing; and publishing and other.
Rail deregulation, trade liberalization and challenges to the CWB prompted a
major restructuring of the Canadian grain industry in the 1990s (for more details,
see Lang 2006). In 1995, the long-standing subsidy on grain transportation—the
Crow Rate—was removed due, in part, to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement and a move to cut federal government spending. The railways were al-
lowed to set their freight rates (subject to a revenue cap) and to close branch lines.
In reaction to a more liberalized trading environment created by both the WTO
agreement and NAFTA, as well as a belief that the CWB might disappear, a num-
ber of the multinational grain companies entered the Western Canadian market. In
response, the Pools and UGG consolidated their grain handling operations, built
large inland terminals on the main lines, and modernized their grain handling sys-
tems. The SWP, in particular, began to diversify its operations towards value-added
activities.
The Share Conversion and Subsequent Events
As early as the mid-1980s, it was apparent that the Pool was facing a major
ﬁnancial hurdle. With nearly half its membership approaching retirement, the Pool
required morethan C$100 millionto make patronageequity payouts (Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool [SWP] Equity Conversion 1995).2 That hurdle, coupled with declining
net earnings (see ﬁgure 1) and the co-op’s desire to rebuild its elevator network
and to diversity its operations, drove the Pool to consider new ﬁnancing options.
In 1994, delegates approved a dual A-B share structure under which the B shares
would trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
In the A-B share structure, the Pool used the A shares to leave control in the
hands of the farmer membership, and converted retained member equity into trad-
able B shares. The B shares were viewed as a permanent source of equity (in com-
parison, traditional member equity is typically considered by banks as debt because
it must be repaid to members upon their retirement or exit from farming). With the
new ﬁnancial structure, the problem of redeeming member equity was solved and4 Journal of Cooperatives
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ﬁnancial institutions greatly expanded the money that they were willing to lend to
the Pool for its elevator rebuilding and business expansion programs.
Under the conversion, farmer-members each received one A share worth C$25.
This share gave each farmer-member the right to one vote when electing delegates
and the right to participate in Pool committees. The remainder of a farmer’s equity
was converted to B shares at a rate of C$12 per share; these shares could then be
bought and sold on the Toronto Stock Exchange.3 Investors were able to purchase
B shares up to a maximum of 10 percent of the total issued and outstanding shares,
a limit that was intended to keep ownership of the Pool diffuse. An amendment in
2002 allowed for a higher ownership limit to be granted in special circumstances.
The ownership limit was removed in 2005 when the Pool became a business corpo-
ration.
Trading started on 2 April 1996 with shares opening at C$12.00. They rose
quickly, peaking at C$24.20 in November 1997, and then steadily declined (seeVol. 23[2009] 5
Figure 2. Price of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool B Shares on the TSE, 1996–2004
 Source: CFMRC TSE Database
ﬁgure 2). The share price fell below C$12.00 in late September 1998 and reached a
low of C$0.18 per share in March 2003.
Although the share conversion did not immediately provide the Pool with ac-
cess to any more equity capital (a subsequent share offering in 1998 added C$110
million in equity), the new ﬁnancial structure meant that ﬁnancial institutions were
willing to make available a signiﬁcant amount of additional debt capital that the
Pool used to pursue new business lines and rebuild its elevator system. Based on
the increase in long-term debt that occurred, the Pool likely had access to at least
C$400 million in extra credit.
In 1997, the Pool announced both Project Horizon and its ﬁrst foreign direct
investments. Project Horizon was the Pool’s elevator rebuilding initiative, which
entailed building twenty-two facilities at a cost of C$270 million at locations across
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta. The foreign direct investments included ter-
minal construction in Poland and Mexico, ownership in an England-based trading
company, and a joint venture terminal with General Mills in North Dakota.
The Pool also made other investments and acquired other operations. Included
among these investments and acquisitions were an oats processing facility, a hog6 Journal of Cooperatives
Figure 3. SWP Long-Term Debt and Acquisitions by Decade, 1974–2003
Source: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Annual Reports
processing facility, a farm input supply business, a number of hog production units,
and several food processing businesses. As a result of an unparalleled number of
acquisitions and investments (see list of acquisitions by decade in ﬁgure 3), long-
term debt rose from C$97.4 million in 1996 to more than C$539.9 million in 1999
(all ﬁgures in 2005$C) (see ﬁgure 3).
In addition to a rising debt, both market share and net income declined sharply
(see ﬁgure 1). Net losses began in the 1998–99 crop year, the Pool’s 75th year of
operation, and persisted for the next six crop years. From 1993 to 2003, the SWP’s
grain handling market share in Saskatchewan fell from 61 percent to 33 percent. As
a result of the poor ﬁnancial showing, both Chief Executive Ofﬁcer Don Loewen
and Chief Operating Ofﬁcer Bruce Johnson were asked to resign in 1999. A new
CEO, Mayo Schmidt, was hired in 2000. Schmidt’s efforts to slash debt through
massive divestment were unsuccessful. In early 2003, the Pool was forced into a
C$405 million debt restructuring plan and further divestment of major assets.Vol. 23[2009] 7
As the Pool’s ﬁnancial problems grew, it began shedding its co-op identity. The
ownership limit on shares was revised in 2002, which opened the door for compa-
nies to buy a major position in the Pool. The board makeup went through a series
of changes. The ﬁrst change was the addition of two outside advisors in 1998. The
board size was then decreased from sixteen to twelve members in 2000, with two of
the twelve board members being external. As part of the 2003 reﬁnancing obliga-
tions, the number of external members was increased to four, leaving eight farmer
board members. Two years later the Pool became a federal corporation under the
Canada Business Corporations Act, which altered the board makeup to seven ap-
pointed directors, four elected farmer-board members and the CEO. Legally, the
Pool was no longer a co-op. The shares were re-evaluated and traded under the
symbol SWP.4
As a corporation, the Pool further pared its elevator network to 44 primary el-
evators in 2006. In late 2006, the Pool entered a bidding war with James Richard-
son International (JRI) for Agricore United. SWP won the bidding war, with Agri-
core United accepting the takeover bid in early 2007.5 The amalgamated company,
known as Viterra, is the largest grain handler in Canada, with 30 percent of the
primary elevators, 39 percent of the port terminal capacity, and 36 percent of the li-
censed storage capacity (Canadian Grain Commission 2007).6 In May 2009, Viterra
announced a proposal to purchase ABB Grain Ltd of Australia.
Conceptual Framework
Two conceptual frameworks are used to examine the decisions made by the
SWP during the 1990s: cognitive theories of hubris and overconﬁdence, and agency
theory. Both theories provide explanations for why the Pool’s investment decisions
were unsuccessful. Other factors, of course, were also at work. For instance, a sig-
niﬁcant drop in member commitment has been identiﬁed as an important factor in
explaining the poor performance of Project Horizon and the Pool in the late 1990s
(Lang & Fulton 2004; see also Lamprinakis 2008). The focus on overconﬁdence
and agency in this article is undertaken to explore more fully these two factors and
their interrelationship.
Overconﬁdence and Hubris
Business executives are generally thought to be overconﬁdent (Brown & Sarma
2007).Thisoveroptimismcanbelinkedtoselectionbias(Gervais,Heaton&Odean
2006), as well as a number of cognitive errors—mistakes in the way that informa-
tion is processed—that executives routinely make (Lovallo & Kahneman 2003).7
Among these errors or biases is the propensity for people to overstate their ability—
i.e.,toseethemselvesasaboveaverageintheirabilitiesandskills.Closelyrelatedto8 Journal of Cooperatives
this problem are attribution errors, the inclination that people have to attribute pos-
itive outcomes to things that they have done, while attributing negative outcomes
to outside events. One of the consequences of these cognitive errors is hubris; man-
agers believe they can do anything, even in situations where others have not suc-
ceeded.
Over-optimism in business settings also springs from the manner in which busi-
ness plans are developed. Most business plans start with a proposal. By their very
nature, proposals accentuate the positive. However, starting with a proposal that is
tilted towards the positive virtually ensures that the ﬁnal plan shares the same tilt.
The reasoning for this is anchoring, the cognitive tendency to put too much em-
phasis on initial positions and not enough on subsequent information. Furthermore,
information acquired to test the assumptions and claims in the proposal will often
be chosen to support the initial beliefs that underlie the proposal, a result of the
so-called conﬁrmation bias (Lovallo et al. 2007).
Competitorneglectcanalsobeasourceofover-optimism.Businessplansdevel-
oped without considering what competitors are planning can easily result in over-
capacity, price wars, or product duplication.
The best evidence for overconﬁdence and hubris comes from an examination
of business acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate 2005; 2008). This evidence is partic-
ularly applicable to the SWP given the large number of investments it undertook in
the 1990s. The empirical literature shows that ﬁrms generally overpay for acquisi-
tions, and that the shareholder wealth of the acquiring ﬁrm either falls or remains
constant after the takeover.8
There are two underlying reasons cited for this overpayment, overconﬁdence
and hubris, and agency problems.9 Hubris means that CEOs have an overwhelming
presumption that their high valuation of a takeover target is correct, even when it is
not. Hubris and overconﬁdence play a particularly important role when considered
in conjunction with the investment funds to which a CEO has access. If CEOs have
excess cash available, they will tend to invest it in new ventures or acquisitions.
As outlined above, CEOs will tend to overpay for these acquisitions, and so the
investments will often be unsuccessful.
The relationship between CEO hubris and acquisition premium is greater when
board vigilance is lacking—i.e., the less oversight by the board, the greater the
overpayment. Indeed, it is widely understood that agency problems can also lead to
overpayment and poor investments.
Agency theory and oversight
An agency relationship occurs when a principal hires or appoints an agent to
carry out a task on the principal’s behalf. Because the principal and the agent differVol. 23[2009] 9
in their objectives and because the agent typically has more information than the
principal about the environment in which decisions are being made, opportunity
exists for the agent to behave in a manner not in the principal’s interests (Eisenhardt
1989). This means that the principal has to provide appropriate incentives to the
agentstogetthemtobehaveintheprincipal’sbestinterest.Inthebest-casescenario,
the principal’s goals are more or less achieved, albeit at a cost. In the worst-case
scenario, only the agent’s goals are met.
A number of agency relationships exist in agricultural co-ops. In a traditional
co-op, the farmer-members are the ultimate principals with the elected board mem-
bers serving as agents. However, a second agency relationship also exists between
the board and the co-op’s senior management. This cascade of agency relationships
offers substantial room for the agency problem.
Agency theory has been frequently applied to business acquisitions and invest-
ments. Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are likely to be greater in ﬁrms
that have excess cash available for investment and acquisition purposes. Managers
who have access to internal funds do not have to subject themselves to the moni-
toring that external capital markets provide. As a consequence, they are better able
and more likely to make investments that beneﬁt them personally rather than add
shareholder value. Accordingly, Jensen argues, ﬁrms should ensure that excess cash
is paid out to shareholders because doing so results in greater oversight.
Staatz (1987) notes that cooperatives can reach a point in size and complexity
that makes it impossible for the board to fully monitor managerial behaviour, re-
gardless of the board members’ talents. Quarterly board meetings, which are often
the only contact the board has with management, make it difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to ascertain if management has exercised proper due diligence on investment pro-
posals. Farmer-elected board members also may not have the knowledge nor busi-
ness skills that senior managers possess (Ernst and Young Corporate Finance Inc
2002). If board members lack business acumen and simply trust that management
provides accurate projections and assumptions, they may end up granting approval
to nonviable investments. Thus, if information asymmetry is grouped with board
inexperience, an inability to monitor management and an implied trust in manage-
ment, the agency problem could become quite severe.10
In the case of SWP, the agency relationships that existed after the 1996 share
conversion were more complicated than those in traditional co-ops. Because the co-
op’s shares were owned in part by shareholders that were not farmer members, both
the farmer members and the class B shareholders could be classiﬁed as principals.
The board, which was appointed solely by the farmer members, was expected to act
as an agent on behalf of both of these groups in its dealings with senior manage-
ment.10 Journal of Cooperatives
Conceptually, this more complicated agency relationship can be expected to
make the agency problem more severe. Because the goals of the farmer members
and the investors are likely to differ, and thus some compromise is needed between
them, the board and senior management are in a position to claim to both groups
that circumstances require that they meet the goals of the other group, all the while
undertaking actions that meet only management’s goals. And with two groups of
principals in place, the incentive to fully monitor the actions of the board and man-
agement is likely to be reduced. The result is that the board and management may
have more leeway to pursue their own objectives.
In summary, co-ops that are large and diversiﬁed, are publicly traded, have
highly conﬁdent leaders, and have excess internal funds available for investment
are likely to be at greatest risk of overinvesting and having investments turn out
poorly. SWP possessed all these characteristics, and the result, at least in retrospect,




terviews conducted with former SWP management and board members to illustrate
how overconﬁdence and hubris resulted in a number of poor investments, which
resulted in the Pool losing customers and incurring an ever-increasing debt. Further
analysis of these interviews, conducted from September 2004 to April 2005, as well
as additional details on the quotes presented below, can be found in Lang (2006).
Overconﬁdence and Hubris
From 1996 to 1999, the Pool invested in approximately 25 acquisitions and
long-term debt grew ﬁve-fold. This spending stemmed from a belief of urgency.
The Pool believed that it needed to “move rapidly to beat [the] U.S.” and it needed
to “become more of a global player and expand beyond Saskatchewan borders.”
There was a conviction that if the Pool did not “stay at a signiﬁcant size...[it would]
become one of two things: irrelevant or sucked up.” Interviewees recalled how Pool
management and board members arrogantly believed the Pool could become “the
ConAgra of the North” and become “one of four or ﬁve top grain companies in
the world.” A June 1997 Canadian Business article quoted CEO Don Loewen as
saying “if we don’t become a strong, global force, we will just be eaten up by the
American [multinationals]. Quite frankly, they’ll eat our lunch” (Casey 1997).
The 1996 share conversion, by enabling access to greater debt, provided the
capital for rapid expansion. As one interviewee described it, the Pool felt like it hadVol. 23[2009] 11
a “bottomless pit of money.” With the “capital from the public markets, not only
could [the Pool] make a lot of decisions quickly, they felt they were expected to. ”
A sense of conﬁdence permeated the board and management. The Pool believed
it was “well positioned for the changes rapidly transforming the once highly reg-
ulated and stable industry” (1997 SWP Annual Report, p. 14). Other grain indus-
try participants expressed conﬁdence in the Pool as well, which, in turn, served
to validate management and board members’ beliefs. Scott Schroeder of Dominion
Bond Rating Service (DBRS) said the industry changes would “leave few survivors.
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and Cargill will be the only ones—it’s a pretty safe bet.”
(Casey 1997). At the Fourth Agricultural and Food Policy Systems Information
Workshop, Barb Isman, Cargill’s Assistant Vice President of Corporate Affairs,
stated that to gauge the “future of the western agricultural industry,...policy an-
alysts might use their time and resources most wisely if they simply talked to three
companies: SWP, Cargill and...Monsanto.” (Loyns, Knutson, & Meilke 1998, p.
149).
Loewen was seen as the right individual for the job. Investments that he had
orchestrated—speciﬁcally Robin’s Donuts and CSP Foods—had turned out well
for the Pool, so the board “didn’t think he could do anything wrong.” One board
member explained that Loewen was hired because “he was [the] type of individual
who moved fast” and the board knew it had to “keep the reins on this individual
because he [would] be very aggressive.”
Loewen was “absolutely driven by the thought that [the Pool] had to move very
quickly.” He had everybody “hooked on this idea of being the biggest and the best.”
One board member described the Pool as feeling “invincible and that was driven
by Don Loewen’s personality and a number of people around him that just felt
[the Pool] couldn’t be stopped.” Loewen’s power and leadership style was reﬂected
in the investment decision-making. An interviewee described Loewen’s decision-
making as “shoot from the hip” based on good gut feelings.
The need to move quickly to diversify and invest affected the analysis and the
decision-making process. “Ideas did not get...proper and adequate evaluation, if
Loewen wanted to do it everyone would ﬁnd a way to make it happen.” As one
board member explained “the argument that was being made was that if [the Pool]
did it ﬁrst, no matter what we paid for it, we would prevent our competition from
doing it and then we would be successful.”
Some interviewees were of the opinion that people “in very senior operational
positions [had] no outside experience” and “the board did not have the makeup or
people on it...that would occur in a company somewhere else.” One management
employee used the words “naïveté and arrogance” to describe the corporate cul-
ture. The Pool was considered to be lacking the experience and background in its
management and board to say, “No, this doesn’t make sense.”12 Journal of Cooperatives
The quotes and examples presented above provide evidence of signiﬁcant over-
conﬁdence and hubris by the senior management and board. This overconﬁdence
and hubris appears to have stemmed from a number of cognitive errors. Senior man-
agement, along with the rest of the organization, clearly saw itself as above average
in business acumen. Success was believed to have stemmed from the actions and
decisions that management made, rather than due to outside events or good for-
tune. Anchoring and the conﬁrmation bias were both at work—business proposals
and investment analyses were constructed to be optimistic, which in turn appears
to have bred further optimism. Finally, competitor neglect seems to have been im-
portant. Because the Pool felt it could keep out competitors if it moved quickly, the
decisions of these competitors were almost certainly not being considered (see the
next section for additional examples).
When the overconﬁdence and hubris were combined with easy access to addi-
tional debt capital, the result was a major spending spree. And this spending extrav-
aganza was indirectly encouraged by an apparent unwillingness and/or inability of
the board to question and challenge the expenditures being made.
Lack of Oversight
The lack of oversight and its connection to an agency problem at the SWP is
best captured by a former employee:
I think after that, in the 80s and 90s, that is when the quintessential
strugglebetweentheboardandmanagementstarted.Thisisanissuefor
every organization that has boards, whether appointed, elected,...you
have the board and then have your senior management. Senior man-
agement is always in a better position information wise, the manage-
ment staff were usually higher-trained educated people with all sorts
of skills, everything from being able to do social research to account-
ing to all those things. ...You could see the gradual change where the
board became almost dependent as opposed to being the ﬁnal decision-
making body. They basically became dependent on management to tell
them, ’Here’s what you should do and here’s why you should do it.’ At
the board level there probably wasn’t the capability ...but in terms of
being able to make some of these major decisions around [Project Hori-
zon], they pretty much had no choice but to go with what management
put before them and as best as they could make decisions on it.
The relatively complex agency relationships that existed in the Pool after the
conversion greatly inﬂuenced the decisions that were made. For the most part, se-
nior management was able to bring the board on side with respect to its view of theVol. 23[2009] 13
SWP’s future path. All interviewees agreed that, given the deregulation occurring
in the 1980s and early 1990s, the grain industry was evolving into a new system
with new players. They also agreed that the Pool had a strategy to remain a dom-
inant player, although to achieve this goal they would have to move quickly. A
senior manager recalled that “as all the regulations fell away from the grain side
[the Pool] simply had no choice but to become much more market-driven and mar-
ket inﬂuenced.” A diversiﬁcation strategy was so important that both the board and
management believed that the Pool would not survive if it did not diversify.
The acceptance of management’s vision likely reduced the board’s incentive to
monitor management’s actions. The investments and activities proposed by the Pool
were clearly associated with a diversiﬁcation strategy, and the agreed upon need to
move quickly meant that the board’s ability to hold up investment decisions for
sober second thought and analysis was greatly reduced.
There was also no strong incentive for either of the two main principals—
farmers and investors—to monitor the actions of their agent, namely the board.
Patronage payments ended with the share conversion, so farmers lost their incen-
tive to ensure that investments were properly undertaken. And because investors
(the B share owners) could not vote, and therefore could not inﬂuence the board,
they too lacked an incentive to monitor the decisions being made. This lack of in-
centive from both principals was likely a contributing factor in why the board failed
in its oversight role.
Other factors, however, were also at work. The “need for conﬁdentiality in-
creased when [the Pool] went to a share offering.” The Pool had to become less
speciﬁc about where it had business interests because of the risk of insider trad-
ing. This lack of information sharing was part of a larger pattern observed by board
members. As one board member saw it, “There were a lot of things shared with the
president that never got adequately shared with the rest of the board. Getting things
done became more important than sharing information.”
Senior management, however, saw the situation differently. As senior managers
remarked, “the amount of information we supplied was information overload at
times,” and “it was more that the board did not know the questions to ask.” In a
similar vein, the comment was made that, “[t]he board of directors did not have
the makeup or the people on it that would normally have served that check and
balance to senior management.” At the same time, “as the business got more so-
phisticated, and more complicated, and moved further away from the farm gate it
got tougher” for board members to assess proposals. The volume of proposals and
expected promptness for decisions to be made “would have been difﬁcult even for
a competent board to stay abreast and do a fair job of assessing what was coming
in.”14 Journal of Cooperatives
As the Pool expanded, it became increasingly difﬁcult for board members to
provide expertise. Some senior managers said “there wasn’t the person [on the
board] who would do the homework” because, for board members it was “step-
ping way beyond your comfort zone,” and “when it came to managing an entity that
was worth close to a billion dollars in assets they were a little out of their league.”
A board member admitted that “as we got more external, we had to rely more and
more on our CEO and CFO and others to provide us with the types of insights and
analysis we needed to make decisions.”
Overconﬁdence and Lack of Oversight – Impact on Investment Decisions
To further understand how overconﬁdence and lack of oversight affected invest-
ment decisions, this section examines three investments that were mentioned during
nearly every interview: (1) Project Horizon; (2) Humboldt Flour Mills; and (3) the
foreign direct investments.
Project Horizon began with an announcement of the location of all twenty-
two elevators. Construction also began more or less simultaneously on all the high
throughput elevators. The Pool “ﬁrmly believed they were going to stop the com-
petition literally by tying up all the construction capacity for these high through-
put elevators in the short-run.” This “move quickly” approach did not work. Board
members were astonished that companies would build facilities just a few miles
down the road from a SWP high throughput location. The competition’s response
negatively affected the Pool’s revenue projections from grain handling, as the Pool
had “explicitly included in their assumptions that their producers would go to their
high throughput elevators.”
The revenue shortfall was also likely a result of falling member commitment.
As Lang and Fulton (2004) argue, member commitment fell, in part, because the
members no longer saw the Pool as operating in their best interest. This belief was
partially a consequence of the investment activities pursued by the Pool and the
manner in which they were carried out, as the example of Humboldt Flour Mills
shows.
Even though Humboldt Flour Mills was not the Pool’s largest investment, it
“was the bellwether that told everybody else in rural Saskatchewan [that the Pool]
was out of control.” One senior manager described the 1998 acquisition of Hum-
boldt Flour Mills as “a bidding war with Agricore.” When Alberta Wheat Pool
expressed interest in the company, the Pool “didn’t want Alberta Wheat Pool in
farm supplies in innermost Saskatchewan,” so the Pool “ended [up] paying C$16
million for Humboldt Flour Mills.” A range of managers and board members saw
the acquisition as “keep[ing] Agricore out” even if that meant paying “far more than
what made economic sense.”Vol. 23[2009] 15
On the foreign investment side, the Pool made investments in grain handling
terminals in Poland and Mexico in 1997, and in a grain-marketing ﬁrm in England
in 1998. All of these investments were unsuccessful. Interviewees lay part of the
blame for these failed investments on “unscrupulous partners” and data from a con-
sultingcompanythat“didnotcometofruition.”Therewereintervieweeswhopartly
blame the Pool because these were areas where the Pool had no traditional operat-
ing knowledge. One board member was highly critical of the terminal investments:
“I think whether it was bad analysis or it was a lack of insight into the changing en-
vironment, I guess not fully appreciating the strategic inﬂuences in those respective
countries and unstable environments.”
These examples further illustrate the underlying errors that were made in the
analysis of investment projects, the over-optimism that was present in the organi-
zation, and of the lack of effective oversight. Anchoring, the conﬁrmation bias, and
competitor neglect were present. Hubris was also a factor—management had a be-
lief they could make investments in virtually any area, regardless of whether they
had any experience.
Discussion and Conclusions
Looking back at what transpired at SWP in the 1990s, it is not surprising that
the investments made during this period were largely unsuccessful. Both agency
problems and overconﬁdent leaders were present in the Pool. The agency problem
was exacerbated by three factors: (1) ownership and control were separated via the
A-B share structure, leading to a situation where neither the farmer members nor
the investors had an incentive to carefully monitor the activities of the CEO and
senior management; (2) the sheer volume of the investment and acquisition activity
that was undertaken made it virtually impossible for a board to stay on top of what
was happening; and (3) as a result of the change in ﬁnancial structure, the senior
management had available to it a large amount of debt capital. This easy access
to funds also exacerbated the overconﬁdence and hubris that the CEO and senior
management exhibited—new investments could be undertaken without being be
subjected to the scrutiny of the capital market.
In short, SWP succumbed to the two classic problems associated with ﬁnan-
cial investment activity, agency problems and management overconﬁdence. The
result was as expected—the Pool overinvested and made poor investments, the con-
sequence of which was that its ﬁnancial viability was severely challenged. What
started as an attempt to keep the SWP competitive in a rapidly changing market
ended with SWP making bad business decisions, which in turn resulted in the loss
of the Pool’s cooperative structure.16 Journal of Cooperatives
What lessons does the SWP case provide to other cooperatives? Given their
relatively complex agency problems, cooperatives must ensure that someone has
an incentive to oversee the board. In traditional co-ops, the members often play
this role. If members become less connected to the cooperative—perhaps because
of increased size or increased variety of activities—it is important that the board
remains independent and accountable. This point is particularly important if the
sources of ﬁnancing for the co-op become increasingly diverse, which in turn means
that the incentive for any group to monitor the actions of senior management is
reduced.
Oversight by the board is also important. Agriculture co-ops must ensure that
board members have the necessary support and skills to undertake their ﬁduciary re-
sponsibilities. Many co-ops have changed their board makeup to include appointed
members with specialized knowledge and expertise in the ﬁelds of ﬁnance, market-
ing, and accounting. It makes sense to provide ﬁnance and management training
courses for the board to ensure that they can analyze projections and assumptions
behind the decisions being made. A board with strong knowledge and business
skills will help alleviate the risk of information asymmetry.
These suggestions are means of dealing with the long understood problem of
information asymmetry. The case presented in this article suggests that cognitive
asymmetry is also important. It is critical that a board ﬁnd ways of getting at the
cognitive errors that they and their senior management are likely to make. There are
ways, for instance, of dealing with overconﬁdence and the cognitive errors that un-
derpin it, and cooperative boards need to embrace these techniques. One technique
that has been suggested is the use of reference classes, a set of analogous situations
to which the current decision can be compared. This technique can be combined
with a process that explicitly accounts for bias (Lovallo & Kahneman 2003). While
boards should not be expected to actually carry out an analysis of proposals using
this technique, they can ensure that it or something similar is used as a part of all
decision-making. A board, for instance, could establish a policy whereby it would
not approve a proposal without a report on the results of such exercises.
In summary, cooperatives are likely to face an increasing number of governance
problems as they adapt to rapidly changing economic environments and adopt in-
creasingly complex forms of ﬁnancing. As the SWP example illustrates, problems
of agency and cognition can be particularly troublesome for cooperatives. Special
attention to these problems will be necessary if cooperatives are to retain their co-
operative nature.
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1. See Fowke (1957) for a history of the Prairie grain industry from 1900–1950. For a
history of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool prior to the 1980s, see Fairbairn (1984).
2. WhilethePoolwasundernolegalobligationtorepaymemberequity,therewasastrong
expectation by the membership that repayment would occur.
3. A trading period prior to the share opening allowed farmers to trade shares amongst
each other. At the start of trading on April 2, 1996 Saskatchewan farmer-members owned
just over half (53 percent) of the Pool’s capital. There were 29.6 million Class B shares
issued; 15.7 million to farmers; 6.4 million to non-Saskatchewan investors; 6.1 million to
Saskatchewan investors; and 1.1 million to SWP employees (Briere 1996).
4. As a publicly traded cooperative from 1996 to 2005, the SWP’s ticker symbol was
SWP.B.
5. For an examination of Agricore United’s decision to accept the Pool’s takeover bid, see
Earl (2009).
6. To satisfy the federal Competition Bureau, the Pool and Agricore United were required
to turn over ownership of 24 elevators and nine farm service centres to JRI and Cargill
(Ewins 2007a). Without this turnover, Viterra would have controlled 68% of the licensed
storage capacity in Western Canada (Ewins 2007b).
7. In explaining the role of overconﬁdence and hubris on business strategy, Lovallo &
Kahneman (2003) are followed closely.
8. Using evidence from 1973–1998, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) present evi-
dence that the stock value of the acquiring ﬁrm falls with an acquisition, although this result
is not statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. A review of numerous earlier studies
is also provided in this paper.
9. See Brown and Sarma (2007). Roll (1986) was one of the ﬁrst to demonstrate that
hubris is responsible for overbidding. Heaton (2002) discusses the interaction of optimism
and excess cash on investment decisions. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) conclude that the
relationship between CEO hubris and acquisition premium is greater when board vigilance
is lacking.
10. The problem is argued to be particularly acute in cooperatives because they lack a
publicly traded share that serves as an indicator of ﬁnancial health (Cook 1995; Vitaliano
1983). A test of the agency problem in agricultural cooperatives using the Jensen (1986)
framework is presented in Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) and Hailu (2005).
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